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INTRODUCTION
It is hard to overstate the viral nature of social media.1  Given that
social media as we know it only began in 2002,2 the statistics are stag-
gering: approximately 73% of all American adults who are online use
some form of social media.3  With its widespread nature, it is only nat-
ural that social media has introduced new cultural norms, including
the culture of “sharing.”4  These days, everyone is sharing intimate
details of their lives in an unprecedented manner.  From where they
are eating5 and whom they are eating with,6 to their work failures and
successes7—we know more about our “friends,”8 even as our interper-
sonal skills are on the decline.9  All of this sharing has not gone to
1. See JONAH BERGER, CONTAGIOUS: WHY THINGS CATCH ON 6 (2013).  For those readers
unfamiliar with social media, the use of the term “viral” is a bit tongue-in-cheek.  “Viral” is a
term used often to describe a video, photo, or idea that has spread through social media quickly,
from one person to another. Id. at 6 n.*.
2. See James Grimmelman, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1144 (2009) (recounting
how Friendster, which was established in 2002, is considered to be the first “prototypical” social
media site).
3. MAEVE DUGGAN & AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CTR., SOCIAL MEDIA UPDATE 2013, at
1 (2014), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/12/30/social-media-update-2013/.
4. See MAEVE DUGGAN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., PHOTO AND VIDEO SHARING GROW ONLINE
2 (2013), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/10/28/photo-and-video-sharing-grow-on-
line/ (reporting that at least 62% of all internet users have created or shared videos or photos
through networking sites).
5. See About Us, FOURSQUARE, https://foursquare.com/about (last visited Feb. 11, 2015) (“In
2009, Foursquare launched the check-in and real-time location sharing with friends.”).
6. See About Facebook, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/facebook/info?tab=page_info
(last visited Feb. 21, 2014) (“Founded in 2004, Facebook’s mission is to give people the power to
share and make the world more open and connected.  People use Facebook to stay connected
with friends and family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and to share and express what
matters to them.”).
7. See A Brief History of LinkedIn, LINKEDIN, http://ourstory.linkedin.com/ (last visited Feb.
11, 2015) (recounting that in 2006, Linkedin launched public profiles, staking “its claim as the
professional profile of record”).
8. See Courteney Palis, 5 Types of People You Should Never Friend on Facebook, HUF-
FINGTON POST (May 28, 2012, 8:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/18/5-people-
avoid-facebook-friends_n_1528630.html.
9. See JANNA ANDERSON & LEE RAINE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., DIGITAL LIFE IN 2025, at 12
(2014), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2014/03/PIP_Report_Future_of_the_Inter
net_Predictions_031114.pdf (“Given there is strong evidence that people are much more willing
to commit petty crimes against people and organizations when they have no face-to-face interac-
tion, the increasing proportion of human interactions mediated by the Internet will continue the
trend toward less respect and less integrity in our relations.”).
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waste: many intellectual property holders are benefiting from our in-
creased sharing of information.  For example, the #AlexFromTarget
meme10 amplified the Target brand,11 potentially persuading members
of the users’ social network to also shop there.12  In addition to the
financial benefits that intellectual property holders have experienced,
ordinary citizens have also benefitted from social-media sharing with
“mash-ups”13 and user-generated content, such as the Downfall movie
clip creations that engage use and build communities of interest.14
Unfortunately for users, intellectual property law has had a hard
time catching up to the norms of sharing.  This means that when the
intellectual property holder objects to the appropriation, the law is a
harsh tool that may be used to halt the sharing.15  One of the reasons
for this is that intellectual property law has traditionally been pre-
mised on the principle of exclusivity, at least for a defined period of
years in patent and copyright law.16  And intellectual property holders
reinforce their exclusivity through lawsuits, threatened litigation, and
legislative lobbying.17  Their efforts, for the most part, have been ef-
10. Meme, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dic-
tionary/meme (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).  A meme is “an idea, behavior, style, or usage that
spreads from person to person within a culture.” Id.
11. Cf. Deborah R. Gerhardt, Social Media Amplify Consumer Investment in Trademarks, 90
N.C. L. REV. 1491, 1505–08 (2012) (discussing how “[b]rands serve as permanent ties on social
media sites” and how users on those sites “use[ ] brands to define [their] sense of self and con-
struct a public persona”).
12. See Maureen O’Connor, “Alex From Target” and the Mess of Uncontrollable Fame, N.Y.
MAG (Nov. 6, 2014, 3:30 PM), http://www.nymag.com/thecut/2014/11/alex-from-target-fame
.html.  In particular, teenage girls who would be interested in meeting good-looking guys, such as
the teenager Alex from the meme. See id. Target jumped on the social-media bandwagon and
tweeted, “We heart Alex, too! #alexfromtarget.” TWITTER (Nov. 3, 2014, 7:47AM), https://twit-
ter.com/target/status/529298903896961025.  As of May 22, 2015, this tweet has been retweeted
28,046 times and favorited 46,505 times. Id.
13. “[M]ash-ups are compilations of pre-existing songs blended and spliced together to create
an entirely new song.” Anna Shapell, “Give Me a Beat:” Mixing and Mashing Copyright Law To
Encompass Sample-Based Music, 12 J. HIGH TECH. L. 519, 519 (2012).
14. See generally Aaron Schwabach, Reclaiming Copyright from the Outside In: What the
Downfall Hitler Meme Means for Transformative Works, Fair Use, and Parody, 8 BUFFALO IN-
TELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 2–4 (2012).
15. See generally Leah Chan Grinvald, Policing the Cease-and-Desist Letter, 49 U.S.F. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015), [hereinafter Grinvald, Policing], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=2515455 (discussing the problem of overenforcement of intellectual prop-
erty rights through abusive cease-and-desist letters).  This is accomplished either through actual
use of the law through lawsuits, or simply by threatening a lawsuit through an abusive cease-and-
desist letter. See id.
16. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of
Science and the useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
17. For example, two large intellectual property attorneys’ organizations, the International
Trademark Association (INTA) and the American Intellectual Property Lawyers’ Association
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fective in maintaining the status quo or even strengthening the laws.18
Consequently, in spite of the sharing by some creators and innovators
who may own intellectual property, the voices of objecting rights hold-
ers are heard louder than others.19
The problem with this attack on social media’s sharing culture is
that it may lead to a sterile and sycophantic world where the only
shareable creations are approved by intellectual property holders.20
Another possibility is that this attack on the sharing culture encour-
ages more users to treat intellectual property laws as irrelevant.  Ei-
ther option would be a serious detriment to society.  There are great
societal benefits to social media’s sharing culture, and at the same
time, to intellectual property laws.  But if intellectual property laws do
not adapt, creativity, political action, social commentary, and criticism
will all be stymied on social media, which will likely push more users
into flouting the laws.  Although I have been critical of the expansion
of intellectual property laws, I do believe that when appropriately cali-
brated, intellectual property laws serve a valuable function in protect-
ing authenticity and quality.21  Intellectual property laws can and
should adapt to the sharing culture, and user voices should be taken
into account.  Therefore, this Commentary seeks to answer the ques-
tion of how to strengthen the voices of the users such that they begin
to be heard.22
Part of the answer to this question can be found within an unex-
pected source:23 Professor Roberta Rosenthal Kwall’s fascinating new
(AIPLA), were instrumental in lobbying Congress to change the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act after the United States Supreme Court had increased the standard of proof.  Marc L. Del-
flache et al., Life After Moseley: The Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 125, 144–45 (2007).
18. See Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 500 (2001) (“Internal cul-
tural ferment is suppressed as law authorizes the exclusion of dissenters who threaten to dilute a
culture’s distinctiveness.”).
19. See generally James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property
Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882 (2007) (describing the “feedback” loop that occurs from licensing
practices).
20. For example, Coca-Cola’s Facebook page was initially created by two Coke fans, but then
adopted by Coca-Cola as its official page.  The two fans were then hired to maintain the page.
Gerhardt, supra note 11, at 1513.
21. See Leah Chan Grinvald, Resolving the IP Disconnect for Small Businesses, 95 MAR-
QUETTE L. REV. 1491, 1508–09 (2012) [hereinafter Grinvald, Resolving the IP Disconnect] (dis-
cussing the differences between counterfeit enforcement and trademark infringement
enforcement and acknowledging that counterfeit enforcement is warranted).
22. Many other scholars have looked at this question from different angles. See sources dis-
cussed infra notes 134–167.
23. Professor Kwall, who has drawn parallels and connections between Jewish law and intel-
lectual property law in prior work. See sources cited infra note 98.  In addition, other notable
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work, The Myth of the Cultural Jew.24  In her new book, Professor
Kwall grapples with similar issues within Judaism and Jewish law, and
relevant parallels exist between Jewish law and intellectual property
law.25  From The Myth of the Cultural Jew, this Commentary draws
three lessons to assist in strengthening the voices and actions of social-
media users.  The first lesson is that the different strata of any particu-
lar community are intertwined.  The power relationship between the
top-down lawmakers and the bottom-up community members are in-
extricably interdependent.26  Due to this interdependence, the com-
munity must work together within the same legal tradition.  While
there is a place for cultural dissent, Professor Kwall persuasively ar-
gues that turning one’s back on the legal tradition will contradict the
desired goal of maintaining the global Jewish tradition.27  Second,
based on her work, this Commentary concludes that the group that
will be most powerful and likely most successful in influencing legal
changes will be a middle group.28  Professor Kwall shows us that
within the Jewish community, a larger middle ground is needed—one
that can be authentic within the tradition, but advocate for change.29
Lastly, Professor Kwall’s book persuades the reader that it will often
be easier to change interpretative prohibitions versus explicit ones.30
Interpretative prohibitions are those that are not written in the law,
but rather are legal norms or customs that have developed over the
course of time.31  These norms or customs can have the force of law,
but are more amenable to change, particularly when the voices of the
community are taken into account.32
The remainder of this Commentary illuminates these lessons over
the course of three parts.  Part I provides an overview of Professor
Kwall’s book, focusing on these three lessons as they relate to this
Commentary’s goal of strengthening the voices of social-media
scholars have also looked at the interplay between Jewish law and intellectual property law. See
sources cited infra note 97.
24. ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE MYTH OF THE CULTURAL JEW: CULTURE AND LAW
IN  JEWISH TRADITION (2015).
25. See infra Part III.C.
26. See infra Part II.A.3.
27. See infra Part II.B.
28. See infra Part II.B.
29. KWALL, supra note 24, at 287.
30. See infra Part II.C.
31. As will be discussed further in Part II.C.3 and Part III.C, in copyright and trademark law,
commercial parodies of copyrighted works or brands are implicit prohibitions.  The statutory
text does not prohibit such unauthorized uses of intellectual property, but yet some courts have
interpreted the law to prohibit commercial parodies. See infra Part III.C.
32. See infra Part III.C.
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users.33  In Part II, attention is given to a discussion of social media,
providing an overview of the growth of the sharing culture and the
attack on that culture by some intellectual property holders.  Parallels
are then drawn between Professor Kwall’s book and the sharing cul-
ture’s relationship to intellectual property holders and the law.  Part
III then utilizes the lessons drawn from The Myth of the Cultural Jew
to help craft suggestions to strengthen the voices of social-media
users.  Utilizing one of the central lessons drawn from Professor
Kwall’s book, this Commentary argues that well-educated social-me-
dia users are needed.  This Commentary terms this group the mid-
dleists, who are users who are intimately knowledgeable about
intellectual property laws who can successfully rebuff overenforce-
ment efforts by intellectual property holders.  In addition, this Com-
mentary argues that this group of “middleists” must work within the
law and be strategic in choosing interpretative prohibitions to seek to
change first.  Through this, a collective impact can be made and assist
in preserving the benefits of sharing through social media.
II. LESSONS FROM THE MYTH OF THE CULTURAL JEW
The Myth of the Cultural Jew is an elegant and well-researched
book that will be fascinating to Jews and non-Jews alike.  First and
foremost, Professor Kwall’s work adds richness to the reader’s knowl-
edge and understanding of Judaism and Jewish law (halakhah), even
to those readers who are Jewish.  Professor Kwall’s central thesis is
that because Jewish law and Jewish culture are “deeply intertwined,”34
even Jews who believe they are simply “culturally Jewish” must em-
brace halakhah to some degree.35  Related to her thesis, Professor
Kwall seeks answers to the burning issue facing modern Judaism: sur-
vival.  Professor Kwall finds both the proof for her thesis and answers
to Jewish survival in cultural analysis.
Among Professor Kwall’s many contributions to the recent and ex-
tensive literature on law and cultural analysis36 is her ability to lucidly
33. It goes without saying that there are many layers to The Myth of the Cultural Jew, but due
to space and subject-matter limitations, they cannot all be covered.  I simply urge you to read the
book for yourself.
34. KWALL, supra note 24, at 25.
35. See id. at 281.
36. See generally JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND
THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE (2012); PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SIBLEY, THE COMMON
PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998); PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY
OF LAW (1999); JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERY-
DAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2015); MADHAVI SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO A GOOD LIFE
(2012); Dan Hunter, Culture War, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1105 (2005); Naomi Mezey, Law as Culture,
13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35 (2001); Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, Beyond Legal Realism?:
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explain and expound on the benefits of using cultural analysis as an
analytical tool.  Because this methodology is concerned with under-
standing cultural dissent and its interdependence with social norms, it
is one of the best tools to facilitate legal and cultural change from
within a particular culture.37  Both Professor Kwall and this Commen-
tary are concerned with this concept.  Whereas Professor Kwall is con-
cerned with historical and current applications of Jewish law to
facilitate the survival of the Jewish tradition, this Commentary seeks
ways to adapt intellectual property law to social-media users in order
to retain the sharing culture that has developed.
As other cultural analysis theorists have argued, often the voices of
the more powerful members within a cultural group are heard, over-
shadowing the voices of the cultural dissenters.38  Building on this,
Professor Kwall insightfully discovers that a larger, louder middle
group is what is needed to navigate the extremes in order to allow
both preservation of the cultural tradition with necessary change.39
As she demonstrates, changes to cultural tradition can be more easily
accomplished when the norms sought to be changed do not embody
explicit prohibitions.  The remainder of this Part further explores the
three lessons taken from Professor Kwall’s book, and is followed by
an analysis of the parallels between Professor Kwall’s work and the
social-media user community’s struggle with intellectual property law
in Part II.
A. Power Relationships and Jewish Law
Professor Kwall writes that in Judaism, there are two main relation-
ships, where power flows vertically and horizontally.40  First, there is a
vertical-power relationship between God and the Jewish people: “Jew-
ish law is steeped in a vertical conception of Divine authority over
mankind.”41  There is a second vertical-power relationship between
the Jewish people and their rabbis: “the rabbis declared the law and
the people obeyed.”42
Cultural Analysis, Cultural Studies, and the Situation of Legal Scholarship, 13 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 3 (2001).
37. Sunder, supra note 18, at 555 (“[A] cultural dissent approach would recognize—and ac-
commodate—seismic shifts in culture. And very different results are likely to flow from this
approach.”).
38. Id. at 515.
39. See KWALL, supra note 24, at 288; see also infra Part II.B.
40. KWALL, supra note 24, at 14.
41. Id. at 15.
42. Id. at 14.
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On the other hand, because “the development and interpretation of
Jewish law is within the purview of human beings” who “are, in the-
ory, equal to one another,” Jewish lawmaking also has a horizontal
component.43  Significantly, however, “much of the Jewish tradition
was shaped by the people’s own practices or customs that often arose
in a manner parallel to the exercise of lawmaking authority by the
rabbis.”44  Professor Kwall notes that “[t]his bottom-up phenomenon
affords another horizontal dimension to the mesorah [Jewish tradi-
tion] given that customs are not the product of either Divine authority
or rabbinic leadership.”45  In short, the top-down lawmaking element
is intertwined with the bottom-up practices of the community of Jew-
ish people.  Through their everyday practices, the community has had
a feedback effect on the top-down interpretation and enforcement of
halakhah.46
1. Top-Down Lawmaking
The process of Jewish lawmaking has traditionally been through a
top-down vertical-power relationship, beginning with the transfer of
the Ten Commandments from God to Moses at Mount Sinai.47  In
Chapter 2, Professor Kwall provides an extensive overview of the ori-
gin and development of Jewish law from the top-down view.48  From
this starting point, Professor Kwall is able to show a logical progres-
sion of the Jewish law from Mount Sinai to the Talmudic period and
beyond.49  Throughout all of these periods, Professor Kwall points to
the ingenuity of the rabbis in tying new approaches to Judaism to the
past, such that these “new” approaches seemed authentic.  For exam-
ple, in the Talmudic period, Professor Kwall uses the Passover meal as
an illustration of the innovation linked to continuity: it is the “proto-
typical example of the rabbinic model at work.”50  Similar to the mod-
ern-day American Jew, Jews living during the Talmudic period faced a
sustainability issue due to the destruction of the Second Temple, along
with its sacrificial culture.  From a cultural analysis standpoint, the




46. This “feedback” effect is not singular to the Jewish community. See generally Gibson,
supra note 19 (arguing that the feedback loop in intellectual property law comes from licensing
practices).
47. See KWALL, supra note 24, at 29.
48. Id. at 29–54.
49. See id. at 32–49.
50. Id. at 45.
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for sustainability that not only relied on past Jewish tradition but also
borrowed from and reinterpreted elements from the surrounding ma-
jority cultures, such as Hellenism.51  Therefore, although the sur-
rounding cultures influenced the development of halakhah, it was
used as the binding glue to keep the Jews within the tradition while
moving them forward within their current environment.
2. Bottom-Up Community
In Chapter 3, Professor Kwall turns her attention to the community
of the Jewish people, or the view from the bottom up.52  In this chap-
ter, Professor Kwall explores how some persistent practices or cus-
toms of the bottom-up community wove their way into halakhah.  This
is central to a cultural analysis of the law: “[t]he contribution of the
bottom up to the development of all of the customs discussed is highly
significant from a cultural analysis standpoint.”53  Professor Kwall fo-
cuses on three themes where the practices of the Jewish people have
had an impact: (1) where the community practices have validated bib-
lical and rabbinic texts, laws, and authority; (2) where community
practices have been relied on by rabbinic determinations (or influ-
ences) of the law; and (3) where community practices have been toler-
ated by rabbis, even when the law does not formally endorse the
practice.54  Due to concerns of space in this Commentary, only the
second theme will be discussed further.55
For the second theme, the reliance on the bottom-up community
practice to inform halakhah, Professor Kwall provides the example of
the increasing stringencies of the laws surrounding food, or kashrut.56
An important element of kashrut is the separation of dairy and meat
products.  But for all of its importance, the Torah does not contain
much guidance about this complicated area.57  Due to this, the devel-
opment of kashrut illustrates the importance of a cultural analysis
methodology.  For example, some modern scholars have been shocked
51. Id.
52. Id. at 55–84.
53. KWALL, supra note 24, at 58.
54. Id. at 61.
55. The first and third themes are very interesting in-and-of themselves.  For example, Jewish
practices that validated rabbinic authority include those surrounding childbirth amulets, such as
the one that inscribed the three commandments for women. Id. at 67.  An example of the third
theme, toleration of customs lacking specific bases in halakhah, the eighteenth-century German
practice of allowing a Torah scroll taken from local synagogues to be placed in a baby’s delivery
room. Id. at 74–75.
56. Id. at 81.
57. Id.  The Torah prohibition states, “You shall not boil a kid in its mother’s milk.” Exodus
23:19.
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to learn that back in the fourteenth century, separate dishware was
not required if the food served was cold.58  However, the practice of
separate dishes has become so ingrained in Jewish practice, that it has
the force of law: “serving cold cuts on a ‘dairy’ dish [is] simply treif
(not kosher).”59  As Professor Kwall notes, “The development of the
kosher kitchen customs is one of many illustrative examples of how
bottom-up practices substantially impacted the development of
halakhah from the top down.”60  This “feedback” mechanism illus-
trates the interdependence of the top-down and bottom-up within Ju-
daism.  This interdependence results in a need to work within the legal
tradition while seeking legal changes, will be discussed in the next
section.
3. Working Within the Legal Tradition
Having established the interdependence between the top-down and
bottom-up practices within Judaism, Professor Kwall next illustrates
the need for members of the community to work within the legal tra-
dition while seeking changes to that tradition.  Without the terminol-
ogy of the law, groups that attempt to work outside of the legal
tradition are not viewed as authentic, and the “cultural and religious
community disintegrates.”61  Because the main thrust of cultural dis-
senters (those who desire change) is to stay within the community,62
working outside of the legal tradition is counterproductive if it brings
about disintegration.
To illustrate this, Professor Kwall first provides a historical perspec-
tive of the three major denominations of Judaism in Chapter 4, which
lays another necessary foundation for the remainder of the book.  As
Professor Kwall demonstrates through her discussion, each of the de-
nominations views the relevance of halakhah differently: (1) “Jewish
law informs Jewish life but is not binding upon the Jews”; (2) “Jewish
law is binding, but its interpretation should mesh with modernity in a
way that preserves its authenticity yet allows for its evolution”; and
(3) “Jewish law is binding, and modernity is not a significant factor in
its interpretation (although current realities can influence its applica-
58. KWALL, supra note 24, at 81 (quoting Haym Soloveitchik on this evolution of this kashrut
practice).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 83.
61. Id. at 162.
62. Sunder, supra note 18, at 516.  However, there are those who leave the community to
create offshoots of the original community, such as Humanistic Judaism. See KWALL, supra note
24, at 93.
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tion.).”63  These three perspectives roughly correspond to how Jewish
law is viewed in the Reform, Conservative, and Orthodox movements
respectively, although, of course, there are variations.  An interesting
observation by Professor Kwall is that the more a community moves
to the left (away from the binding nature of halakhah), the more it is
seen as inauthentic by more traditional communities.64  For example,
one movement that was founded in 1963, Humanistic Judaism, is
viewed as completely beyond the pale even by Reform Judaism.  This
is because Humanistic Judaism eliminates not only the need for adher-
ence to halakhah, but also the need for belief in God.65
With this background in place, Professor Kwall examines some of
the major issues facing Judaism in the modern age in Chapters 5
(“Foundational Conflicts”),66 6 (“Homosexuality”),67 and 7 (“Women
and Synagogue Ritual”)68 through the framework of cultural analysis.
This framework is extremely useful to understand why working within
the legal tradition is critical to maintaining authenticity within the
community.  For example, one of the most foundational issues of Ju-
daism is the question, “Who is a Jew?”  In answering this question,
Reform Judaism has departed from the traditional matrilineal princi-
ple of halakhah.  Instead of requiring one’s mother to be Jewish, Re-
form Judaism has declared that if either parent is Jewish, their
children are presumed Jewish “as long as they publicly manifest a pos-
itive and exclusive Jewish identity.”69  Conservative and Orthodox Ju-
daism have both taken issue with this determination, as prior to 1983,
“all denominations were in agreement on the boundaries of member-
ship.”70  Although Reform Judaism adopted the “Patrilineal Resolu-
tion” as a response to the rise of intermarriage, this change outside of
the legal tradition poses problems for Reform Jews wishing to marry
Conservative or Orthodox Jews, as well as for non-Reform rabbis who
63. Id. at 131.
64. See id. at 93.
[T]he Orthodox see the Reform and Conservative movements as outside the bounda-
ries of the tradition; and Conservative Judaism, at least on a theoretical level, views
Reform Judaism’s unwillingness to embrace the binding nature of halakhah as outside




66. Id. at 129–56.
67. Id. at 157–92.
68. KWALL, supra note 24, at 193–224.
69. Id. at 135.
70. Id. at 139.
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will not perform a wedding ceremony without an official conversion to
Judaism.71
This unilateral change, seen as taking Reform Judaism completely
outside of the law, does not sit well even for some members of Re-
form Judaism.72  This disagreement among Reform Jews highlights an-
other important point emphasized by Professor Kwall, which is that
while the denominational labels appear to neatly categorize American
Jews, they hide the reality of the fluidity of thought and practice.  In
fact, Professor Kwall points out that “there are indications that a
postdenominational mileu is the wave of the future, with the divisions
grouped along the lines of ‘traditional versus progressive’ rather than
specific denominational affiliations.”73  This postdenominationalism is
part of the importance of the emerging middle ground.
B. Growth of the Middle
One of the themes running throughout The Myth of the Cultural
Jew is that a stronger and more vocal middle is needed across denomi-
nations in order to navigate the environmental pressures on Judaism
with the least amount of damage to its authenticity.  This is summed
up in Chapter 10 of the book, “The Lessons of Cultural Analysis”:74
“The overall fluidity of a cultural analysis perspective with respect to
the mesorah [Jewish tradition] underscores the importance of a strong
middle ground in the Jewish community.”75  This strong middle en-
compasses members from all denominations, and Professor Kwall
points out the rising synergies among some members across denomi-
nations.  For example, Rabbi Asher Lopatin, President of Yeshivat
Chovevei Torah, has stated his dream of cutting across denominations:
“My dream is to have Hebrew Union College, the Jewish Theological
Seminary, Hadar, and Chovevei on one campus, to move in together.
We’d each Daven [pray] in our own ways, but it could transform the
Upper West Side.”76
In order to strengthen this middle, Professor Kwall suggests, “Effec-
tive Jewish education geared to non-Orthodox Jews is one of the most
vital ways of fostering a stronger middle ground within the global Jew-
71. See id. at 140.
72. See id. at 139.
73. Id. at 125.
74. KWALL, supra note 24, at 281–97.
75. Id. at 288.
76. Id. at 290 (quoting Rich Dweck, The New “Morethodox” Rabbi Asher Lopatin Succeeds
Avi Weiss at an Influential Seminary, Offering a Pluralistic Version of Orthodoxy, JEWISH PINK
ELEPHANT (May 1, 2013), http://www.jewishpinkelephant.com/2013/05/the-new-morethodox-
rabbi-asher-lopatin.html).
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ish community.”77  This is one way to have community members un-
derstand its own Jewish history in order to interpret the tradition in
new but authentic ways.  In particular, Professor Kwall suggests that
aggadah, which is “not only biblical and rabbinic narrative but also
wisdom, speculation, and folklore, can be especially useful in educat-
ing Jews about the beauty and particularity of the tradition.”78  Profes-
sor Kwall provides a few examples of how narrative can play an
important role in Jewish education because it is accessible and can
interest non-Orthodox Jews with moral lessons.79  One example she
gives is the speech of a newly elected Israeli parliament member, Dr.
Ruth Calderon.  In her speech to the parliament, Dr. Calderon uses
the story of a rabbi who was so focused on his religious studies that he
neglected to come home for his annual visit to his wife (and the rabbi
eventually died due to this).  Calderon explained the story as teaching
us “that one who adheres to the Torah at the expense of being sensi-
tive to human beings is not righteous.”80
The growth of this middle is important.  As Professor Kwall states,
“The right end of the religious spectrum keeps the boundaries in
check and sets the tone; the left end pushes the boundaries and brings
new visions and energy.  The middle provides a critical center that
balances the energies on both sides while operating as a check against
extremist tendencies.”81  It may be that this middle group will be able
to navigate needed changes to the legal tradition that can move Juda-
ism forward, while enabling it to retain its particularity and authentic-
ity.  How this middle group can do this within the legal tradition is
discussed next.
C. Explicit Versus Interpretative Positions
One last lesson this Commentary draws from Professor Kwall’s
highly relevant book is her underscoring of the important strategic
point that when cultural dissenters want change to be made, it is often
easier to influence change where there is gray area in the law.  Within
Judaism, this means that it will be harder (and more radical) to change
a tradition that has a root in biblical law.82  Less radical, although still
difficult to change, is a tradition that involves a reinterpretation or
even a complete abandonment of a rabbinic law, or one that draws
77. Id. at 291.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 293.
80. KWALL, supra note 24, at 292.
81. Id. at 287.
82. Id. at 132.
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from both biblical and rabbinic law.83  This Commentary refers to po-
sitions from biblical law as “explicit,” and to positions from rabbinic
law (or those at the intersection of biblical and rabbinic law) as
“interpretative.”84
In Chapters 6 and 7, Professor Kwall addresses two examples of
conflict based on explicit and interpretative positions: homosexuality85
and female participation in synagogue ritual.86  For the former issue,
homosexuality is explicitly prohibited pursuant to Jewish law found in
the Torah.  In contrast, the prohibition of women publicly reading
from the Torah is more interpretative, and is based more on cultural
responses than explicit law.  Therefore, it is arguable that the embrace
of more female participation in ritual, as desired by cultural dissent-
ers, is easier to achieve within halakhic boundaries.87  Each will be
discussed in turn.
1. Explicit Positions
Chapters 18 and 20 of Leviticus both contain explicit prohibitions
on homosexuality and a punishment: “If a man lies with a male as one
lies with a woman, the two of them have done an abhorrent thing;
they shall be put to death—their bloodguilt is upon them.”88  With this
as the starting point in Chapter 6, Professor Kwall notes that even the
most liberal denomination, Reform Judaism, viewed homosexuality as
prohibited even as late as 1973.89  In recent years, however, it has be-
come impossible not to revisit the issue, given the advancements in
secular society to explicitly acknowledge the rights of gay men and
women to marry and maintain family lives equal in dignity to hetero-
sexual families.90  Through her cultural analysis framework, Professor
Kwall is able to demonstrate the difficulties that each of the denomi-
83. Id.
84. See id. at 64.
[I]t is also the case that when custom is in opposition to the unanimous opinion of the
legal authorities, it will not prevail.  In the words of a fifteenth-century halakhist, “For
if we were to abolish laws prohibiting certain things as a result of the (contrary) minhag
[custom], then one by one all prohibitions will be permitted and the whole of the Torah
set at naught.”
Id.
85. Id. at 157–92.
86. KWALL, supra note 24, at 193–224.
87. Id. at 192 (“This type of situation presents an ideal opportunity for applying cultural anal-
ysis to support a change in willing traditional communities.”).
88. Id. at 157 (quoting Leviticus 20:13).
89. Id. at 158.
90. See generally George Chauncey, Op-Ed, The Long Road to Marriage Equality, N.Y.
TIMES, June 26, 2013, at A31, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/opinion/the-long-
road-to-marriage-equality.html?_r=0.  Of course, the struggle is not completely over. See gener-
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nations has had in addressing this issue.91  Due to the explicit nature
of the prohibition under biblical law, for many traditional thinkers,
there is no movement in halakhah to accept same-sex marriage.92
However, despite this there are members across all denominations
who attempt to work within the traditional boundaries of the law to
create more welcoming synagogue environments for homosexuals and
their families.  This means that a variety of responses to the issue may
ensue, as a cultural analysis methodology does not dictate any particu-
lar result.  But the different responses across the denominations reveal
not only the value of pluralism, but also the inherent difficulty in alter-
ing an explicit legal prohibition.
2. Interpretative Positions
By contrast, an interpretative position, one based on rabbinic law or
where it is unclear whether it is biblical or rabbinic, may be more ame-
nable to change.  One example is the participation of women in syna-
gogue rituals.  In Orthodox Judaism, women are prohibited from
participating in synagogue rituals, such as publicly reading from the
Torah or saying the accompanying blessings (known as aliyyot).93
Professor Kwall traces this prohibition to one embedded in cultural
practices.  Unlike homosexuality, it is not a prohibition based on ex-
plicit language in the Torah or Talmud.  The Talmudic text to which
the prohibition is traced is itself not very clear, as it first states that
women may be called to the Torah on the Sabbath, but then states
that women should not read publicly from the Torah “because of the
dignity of the congregation.”94  After a thorough discussion of other
historical texts and rabbinic opinions, Professor Kwall concludes that
“the classical Jewish sources concerning the issues of women reading
from the Torah and receiving aliyyot contain contradictory strands and
are capable of supporting different conclusions.”95  Professor Kwall
argues that this ambiguity leaves the law more open to cultural influ-
ences: “Thus, the introduction of greater female participation in syna-
gogue ritual can be understood as a natural development in halakhah
ally SEAN CAHILL & SARAH TOBIAS, POLICY ISSUES AFFECTING LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND
TRANSGENDER FAMILIES (2007).
91. KWALL, supra note 24, at 159–63 (discussing Reform Judaism’s response); id. at 163–69
(discussing the Orthodox response); id. at 169–86 (discussing Conservative Judaism’s response).
92. See id. at 164, 167.  Even for some Orthodox rabbis who would welcome a bit more open-
ness in allowing active homosexuals into the Jewish community, same sex marriage is still taboo.
Id. at 167 n.49 (quoting Rabbi Shafner).
93. Id. at 194.
94. Id. at 197 (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Id. at 207.
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based on current understandings of the role and character of women
in today’s cultural milieu rather than as a ‘major reform’ necessitating
a substantial departure from the tradition.”96
In sum, Professor Kwall’s discussion of these two charged issues
shows us that cultural analysis values plurality and preservation of tra-
dition.  Due to this, there will always be some explicit positions that
the voices of the community may not be able to influence.  However,
if the position is interpretative, community voices may be able to
more easily influence changes in the law to reflect current cultural
responses.  This important lesson, along with the other two discussed
above, will be applied in Part III.  Before addressing the applicability
of these lessons to the social-media user community, some ground-
work will be laid with respect to the issues facing this community, and
the parallels to the struggles within the Jewish community.
III. SOCIAL MEDIA, SHARING, AND DRAWING PARALLELS
Although intellectual property law is not “divine” in nature (despite
what some intellectual property holders would have you believe!),
there are parallels between issues within Judaism and within intellec-
tual property law.97  In fact, Professor Kwall herself has previously
written about the parallels between the two fields.98  This section
seeks to draw those parallels in order to make clear that The Myth of
the Cultural Jew has wide-ranging implications for understanding legal
reform.  First, an important foundation will be laid for this Commen-
tary’s use of the term “social media” and the rise of the sharing cul-
ture.  This Commentary then discusses how this sharing culture has
come under attack by those seeking to maintain the traditional exclu-
sivity of intellectual property law.
96. Id. at 194–95.
97. Other notable scholars also find direct applications. See generally Neil W. Netanel &
David Nimmer, Is Copyright Property?—The Debate in Jewish Law, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES
IN L. 241 (2011); David Nimmer, Adams and Bits: Of Jewish Kings and Copyrights, 71 S. CAL. L.
REV. 219 (1998).
98. See generally Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Intellectual Property Law and Jewish Law: A
Comparative Perspective on Absolutism, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 143 (2010) (reviewing DAVID
L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN
ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT (2009)); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Is the Jewish Tradition Intel-
lectual Property?, 4 WIPO J. 129 (2012); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Lessons of Living Gar-
dens and Jewish Process Theology for Authorship and Moral Rights, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 889 (2012); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Remember the Sabbath Day and Enhance Your Creativ-
ity!, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 820 (2013).
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A. Social Media and the Rise of the “Sharing Culture”
The term “social media” is popularly used to refer to an online plat-
form that allows its users to share information and content among a
social network.99  Other scholars writing in this area typically use the
term broadly so that it incorporates all types of various interfaces that
allow for communities to develop and share things of interest to them,
including information (personal and public, such as status updates),
affiliations, and creative endeavors (both of their own making and
other’s).100  This Commentary also uses the term “social media” quite
broadly to encompass all online platforms, whether it be a website, an
application for a smartphone, or otherwise, that are used for shar-
ing.101  One of the more remarkable aspects of social media discussed
in this part102 is the breadth of the sharing culture, from the extent to
which information is shared, to the different types of information
shared.
Sharing information is nothing new; in fact, one could argue that the
whole infrastructure of the Internet was premised on the principle of
sharing information.103  Even in the early days of dial-up connections,
users could post information to be shared with other savvy users.
What is new about social media sharing is the extent to which such
information is shared, which has magnified beyond what the first cre-
ators and users could have ever imagined.  For example, in 1990, when
Tim Berners-Lee created the first webpage so he and his fellow scien-
tists could share information regarding their work at CERN (Euro-
pean Counsel for Nuclear Research), getting others to utilize the web
was a “tough sell.”104  “When you showed people they’d say: ‘Oh
yeah, big deal.’  They didn’t realize if everything was on the Web how
cool it would be.”105  However, social media’s “network” model has
99. Social Media, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster
.com/dictionary/socialmedia (last visited Feb. 11, 2015) (defining “social media” as “forms of
electronic communication (as Websites for social networking and microblogging) through which
users create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other con-
tent (as videos)”).
100. DANAH BOYD, IT’S COMPLICATED: THE SOCIAL LIVES OF NETWORKED TEENS 6 (2014);
see also Gerhardt, supra note 11, at 1495; Lisa P. Ramsey, Brandjacking on Social Networks:
Trademark Infringement by Impersonation of Markholders, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 851, 860 (2010).
101. Almost all of the social media sites or applications have this in common. See David H.
Goff, A History of Social Media Industries, in THE SOCIAL MEDIA INDUSTRIES 16, 29 (Alan B.
Albarran ed., 2013).
102. Of course, there are just too many to discuss in this  Commentary.  For more in-depth
coverage, see generally BOYD, supra note 100; THE SOCIAL MEDIA INDUSTRIES, supra note 101.
103. BOYD, supra note 100, at 5.
104. Geoff Brumfiel, The First Web Page, Amazingly, Is Lost, NPR (May 22, 2013, 4:47 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2013/05/22/185788651/the-first-web-page-amazingly-is-lost.
105. Id. (quoting Mr. Berners-Lee).
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changed this dynamic, in which one user shares her information with
those in her “network.”106  This network is made up of friends, as well
as friends of friends, or others with similar interests.107  Information
that is shared within a network may be more far-reaching than simply
posting a Web page with the same information, particularly if that in-
formation “goes viral.”108
In addition, with social media, the type of information shared has
changed dramatically.  Instead of posting code or other scientific in-
formation, as the first Web pages did,109 users are now sharing per-
sonal information, as well as personal creative endeavors such as
photographs and videos.  A tongue-in-cheek explanation (one of the
many varieties floating around the web) uses a hotdog as an
illustration:
Twitter: I am eating a #hotdog; Facebook: I like hotdogs; Four-
square: Here is where I eat hotdogs; Hipstamatic: Here is a vintage
pic of my hotdog; YouTube: Here, I am eating a hotdog!; Linkedin:
My skills include eating hotdogs; Spotify: Listening to Hotdog;
Google+: I work at Google and eat hotdogs.110
Although this illustration is amusing and harmless, if the illustration
used a trademark, such as “Chanel” or “LV,” the holders of those
trademarks would perhaps not view the use as either amusing or
harmless, particularly if the use was critical in nature.111  And this is
what social-media users are also doing, in addition to sharing their
personal information: they are taking others’ intellectual property and
either sharing it as is or “remixing”112 it.
Further, it is not only users that are sharing in intellectual property
rights, but also the intellectual property holders themselves.113  Nu-
merous examples abound, including the #AlexFromTarget meme, in
which a customer at a Target store snapped a few pictures of a hand-
106. See Gerhardt, supra note 11, at 1495.
107. danah boyd, Why Youth ♥ Social Network Sites: The Role of Networked Publics in Teen-
age Social Life, in YOUTH, IDENTITY, AND DIGITAL MEDIA 119, 123–24 (David Buckingham ed.,
2008).
108. BERGER, supra note 1, at 4–10.
109. Brumfiel, supra note 104.
110. Scott Goodson, Social Media Explained, FORBES (Feb. 6, 2012, 4:53 PM) http://www
.forbes.com/sites/marketshare/2012/02/06/social-media-explained/.
111. See Eric Goldman, Online Word of Mouth and Its Implications for Trademark Law, in
TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 404, 404–05
(Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008).
112. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE
HYBRID ECONOMY (2008).
113. As Professor Deborah Gerhardt has notably pointed out, when a company such as Tup-
perware utilizes Facebook to advertise to its customer base, it is sharing in the use of the trade-
mark “Facebook.”  Gerhardt, supra note 11, at 1515.
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some teenager working at the checkout.  The photos were tweeted
with the hashtag, “#AlexFromTarget” and it went viral: within twenty-
four hours of the initial tweet, the photo was retweeted over 821,000
times.114  The Monday after the initial tweet, Target itself tweeted,
“We heart Alex too. #AlexFromTarget.”115  In this tweet, Target
shared in the intellectual property of one of its customers (the original
photos) and its own employee (for example, the right of publicity for
Alex, because Alex became a sensation and has appeared on Ellen
DeGeneres’ talk show).116  In addition, Target acquiesced to the cus-
tomer’s use of its trademark in the original tweet (and any rights they
may arguably have in the trade dress of employee uniforms or store
layouts, as could be seen from the photos).117
B. The Sharing Culture of Social Media Is Under Attack
Although unauthorized use or sharing of intellectual property, par-
ticularly trademarks and copyrights, is not a new phenomenon, the
nature and the breadth of overlapping networks has expanded its ini-
tial reach.  Popular items can go viral in a matter of seconds with
shares, likes, and retweets.118  In this way, not only are more pur-
ported infringements discovered, but the corresponding alleged harm
is thereby magnified in the eyes of intellectual property holders.119
Intellectual property holders have not taken these developments lying
down; to the contrary, they have intensified their enforcement efforts,
both with litigation and threatened litigation.120  All of this enforce-
ment and, as I have argued elsewhere, overenforcement,121 has begun
to take its toll on sharing, and has even spawned additional litigation:
in one instance, a twenty-nine second video was taken down from
YouTube by Universal Musical Publishing Group (UMPG) because a
114. Jessica Durando, “Alex From Target” Rises to Internet Fame, USA TODAY (Nov. 3, 2014,
12:55 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/11/03/alex-target-twitter-in-
stagram-trending/18408467/.
115. TWITTER, supra note 12.
116. Alison Griswold, Watch Alex from Target Appear on the Ellen Show, SLATE (Nov. 5,
2014, 11:46 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2014/11/05/alex_from_target_watch_the
_teen_idol_and_viral_twitter_meme_appear_on_ellen.html.
117. See Durando, supra note 114 (showing the original image that was tweeted).
118. See BERGER, supra note 1, at 7–8.
119. See Goldman, supra note 111, at 411–13.
120. Grinvald, Policing, supra note 15, at 8–9 (documenting the trend of threatened litigation
through abusive cease-and-desist letters).
121. See generally Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625
[hereinafter Grinvald, Shaming] (arguing that trademark bullies are overenforcing their legal
rights).
1064 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:1045
baby was dancing to a Prince song in the background.122  The mother
of the cute dancing baby brought a lawsuit against UMPG with the
help of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a nonprofit organization
dedicated to preserving user rights on the internet.123  The litigation
has been ongoing since 2007 and is currently at the appellate level.124
Unfortunately, for the most part, the courts125 and Congress126 have
come down on the side of intellectual property holders.  This can be
explained by numerous factors, two of which are the exclusivity theory
that underlies much of intellectual property law, and the value placed
on intellectual property rights in recent times.  With respect to patents
and copyright, the right to exclude others from making any form of
use of one’s patent or copyright for the prescribed term is constitu-
tionally granted.127  For trademarks, the right to exclude was not tradi-
tionally set in stone, and only over time have trademark rights become
practically equivalent to copyrights or patents.128  Hand in hand with
the principle of exclusivity gaining greater force over the last century
has been the increase in the value placed on intellectual property.
Some business entities are valuable simply because of their intellec-
tual property: for example, in 2011, more than half of Apple’s valua-
122. Lenz v. Universal, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/cases/lenz-v-uni-
versal (last visited Mar. 21, 2015).
123. Corynne McSherry, Lenz v. Universal: This Baby May Be Dancing to Trial, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 28, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/01/lenz-v-universal-baby-
may-be-dancing-trial-0.
124. See id.; Appellee & Cross-Appellant’s Reply Brief on Cross-Appeal, Lenz v. Universal
Music Corp., No. 13-16106 (9th Cir. filed Mar. 20, 2014), available at https://www.eff.org/docu-
ment/lenz-reply-0.
125. However, as Professor William McGeveran and other notable professors have pointed
out, when the alleged infringement is an act of free speech, courts typically come out on the side
of free speech, and thus get the case right.  William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use,
94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 51 (2008).  The problem, as Professor McGeveran has noted, is that it is
rare for these cases to come in front of the courts due to a variety of factors, including the lack of
resources by the speaker (or user), resulting in self-censorship after the intellectual property
holder simply threatens litigation. Id. at 51–52.
126. For example, Congress enacted the Copyright Extension Act, which extends the term of
exclusive copyright rights from fifty to seventy years, at the behest of large copyright owners,
such as The Walt Disney Co.  Jack Kapica, Copyright and the Mouse: How Disney’s Mickey
Mouse Changed the World, DIGITAL J. (Oct. 6, 2004), http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/
35485.
127. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
128. Many scholars have written extensively about the “propertization” of trademarks. See
generally Lionel Bently, From Communication to Thing: Historical Aspects to the Conceptualisa-
tion of Trade Marks as Property, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY, supra note 111, at 3; Mark
A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687
(1999); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999).  Additionally,
an important distinction between trademarks and copyright or patents is that a trademark can
theoretically be maintained indefinitely, so long as the holder maintains its use.
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tion came from its trademark portfolio.129  In addition, the rise of the
patent troll business model gives credence to the argument that intel-
lectual property has value that is divorced from any underlying prod-
uct or service.130
The notion of exclusive and valuable rights over one’s creation, in-
vention, or brand does not square comfortably with any notion of
sharing those rights.  The problem with this is that with the technolog-
ical advances seen over the last half century, the use and sharing of
others’ intellectual property has become part of our everyday lives.131
Professor Madhavi Sunder has eloquently argued that we are all “par-
ticipants” in the creative process, and that the new generation of users
“views intellectual properties as the raw materials for its own creative
acts, blurring the lines that have long separated producers from con-
sumers.”132  To illustrate the extent to which others’ intellectual prop-
erty has become part of our everyday existence, Professor John
Tehranian examined how the typical actions of just one day in the life
of a hypothetical person could amount to $12.45 million in copyright
infringement.133  Therefore, these professors and others have argued
that the once-sacrosanct exclusivity notions of intellectual property
must give way to new theories of intellectual property, new norms,
and even to new laws.134
With all of this in favor of reforming our outlook on the exclusive
nature of intellectual property, how can we strengthen the voices of
social-media users and change intellectual property law to accommo-
129. Leah Chan Grinvald, Trademark Law and Theory: A Handbook of Contemporary Re-
search, 2 IP L. BOOK REV. 23 (2011) (book review).
130. See generally Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 325
(2012); Maayan Perel, From Non-Practicing Entities (NPEs) to Non-Practiced Patents (NPPs): A
Proposal for a Patent Working Requirement, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2496281; James Bessen et al., The Private
and Social Costs of Patent Trolls (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 11-45, 2011),
available at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/documents/Bessen-Ford-
Meurer-no-11-45rev.pdf.
131. See Clive Coleman, Parody Copyright Laws Set To Come into Effect, BBC (Oct. 20, 2014,
10:54 AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-29408121 (reporting various artists’
views on creating on social media).
132. Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 263 (2006).
133. JOHN TEHRANIAN, INFRINGEMENT NATION: COPYRIGHT 2.0 AND YOU 2–4 (2011).
134. See generally EDUARDO MOISE´S PEN˜ALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS:
HOW SQUATTERS, PIRATES, AND PROTESTORS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP 23–29 (2010)
(arguing that intellectual property “outlaws” play an important function in the development of
our laws); TEHRANIAN, supra note 133 (arguing for new norms); James Grimmelmann, The In-
ternet Is a Semicommons, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2799 (2010) (arguing for a theory of semicom-
mons for the Internet to preserve public uses of intellectual property); McGeveran, supra note
125 (advocating for the adoption of a new and explicit fair use exception to trademark law);
Sunder, supra note 18 (arguing for a “cultural dissent” theory of the law).
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date this sharing?  I am not the first scholar to ask this question or to
propose solutions to strengthen user voices.135  But this Commentary
is likely the first scholarly approach arguing that we can look for an-
swers based on Professor Kwall’s work concerning the Jewish tradi-
tion.  The next Part draws parallels between Professor Kwall’s analysis
of this tradition and how we can view intellectual property law and the
social-media community.  Part III applies the lessons from The Myth
of the Cultural Jew to suggest a few solutions that may assist us in
strengthening user voices.
C. Drawing Parallels
1. Power Relationships and the Technological Environment
While in Judaism, the first power relationship begins with God as
the divine source of Jewish law, the root source of intellectual prop-
erty protection in the United States is the Constitution.136  The intel-
lectual property statutes that have been enacted by Congress are
based on this constitutionally granted power.137  And in turn, instead
of rabbis, we have courts and judges who interpret the Constitution
and congressional mandates.138
Similar to the Jewish community, the bottom-up social-media com-
munity is interdependent with the top-down community.  For exam-
ple, whereas the more stringent kosher practices of the bottom-up
community has fed back into Jewish law, the licensing practices of the
wider online community has fed back into copyright law.139  In addi-
tion, this interdependence also results from the unique position of in-
tellectual property holders.  Although intellectual property holders
are part of the bottom-up community because they create (and use)
the original works that the community uses and shares, they have
positioned themselves as part of the top-down community through
their enforcement of their intellectual property rights.140  Due to this,
those who wish to change the law see a need to obtain some buy-in
from intellectual property rights holders and continue to work within
the law.141
135. See sources cited infra note 167.
136. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
137. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 100–105 (2012); Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2012);
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141 (2012) (federal trademark law).
138. U.S. CONST. art. III.
139. Gibson, supra note 19, at 884–85.
140. And, as I have argued elsewhere, at times intellectual property holders have been over-
enforcers of the law. See generally Grinvald, Shaming, supra note 121.
141. Buy-in from law enforcement is also critical, as, governmental agency regulations could
be altered to adopt different standards that would be more “friendly” to users.  For example, I
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2. The “Middle” Users and the Legal Tradition
Like the Jewish community, the community of social-media users
can be divided along a spectrum of observance with respect to intel-
lectual property laws.  On the left side of the spectrum are those who
believe that all or almost all intellectual property should be consid-
ered public “commons,” at least with respect to certain uses of intel-
lectual property.142  This can equate to, at times, “scofflaw” actions
that disregard the laws, such as Torrent users or sites like Pirate
Bay.143  On the right side are some intellectual property holders who,
at least with respect to their intellectual property, believe that the in-
tellectual property laws are sacrosanct and should be interpreted ac-
cordingly.  In the middle are those users who may seek compliance or
who unintentionally violate the law, but are typically still targets of
overenforcement by intellectual property holders due to broad inter-
pretations of the law.144  Similar to the Jewish community, however,
there is fluidity in these categories and not all members stay within
these categorical divisions at all times.  For example, not all intellec-
tual property holders take a rigid approach to the exclusivity of their
intellectual property, which was seen with Tesla’s recent announce-
ment that it would not pursue patent enforcement against inventors
who use its patents in good faith.145
Users on the left end of the spectrum of intellectual property law
have had an effect on intellectual property holders that is similar to
that of the more progressive members of Judaism.146  By working
outside of the legal tradition, both the Reform movement, through its
change in the definition of “who is a Jew,” and the intellectual prop-
erty scofflaws have changed the existing legal tradition.  This changed
tradition causes a disconnect within these community groups.  In fact,
the effect that the two “leftist” groups have had is likely more nega-
tive for the entire community: it appears to cause the “rightists” to dig
argued in another piece that the Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) agency currently has the
ability to interpret federal law that requires the CBP to detain intellectual property-infringing
products from entering the United States. See Grinvald, Resolving the IP Disconnect, supra note
21, at 1522–23.
142. Professors Pen˜alver and Katyal document some of these uses in their insightful book
Property Outlaws. PEN˜ALVER & KATYAL, supra note 134, at 55–124.
143. Timothy J. Seppala, The Pirate Bay Shutdown: The Whole Story (So Far), ENGADGET
(Dec. 16, 2014, 2:18 PM), http://www.engadget.com/2014/12/16/pirate-bay-shutdown-explainer/
144. See, e.g., McSherry, supra note 123.
145. Cyrus Farivar, Tesla Will Use Patents To Subvert Patent System, ARS TECHNICA (June 12,
2014, 2:30 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/06/tesla-will-use-patents-to-subvert-pat
ent-systemtesla-frees-patents-wont-initiate-patent-lawsuits-against-anyone/.
146. Of course, this Commentary is not equating the Reform movement to the activity of
intellectual property infringers.
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in their heels and cling to restrictive interpretations of the law.  Pro-
fessor Kwall illustrates this negative effect with Reform Judaism’s
change in the definition of “who is a Jew” by discussing how the Con-
servative and Orthodox denominations have still not accepted the Re-
form movement’s change, and as mentioned previously, this
disconnect continues to cause problems for marriage between Reform
Jews and those who are more traditional.  In the social-media commu-
nity, this can be illustrated by the increasingly popular use of take-
down notices, where in reaction to the proliferation of unauthorized
sharing, some intellectual property holders have intensified their ef-
forts to delete the material.147
It is the middle group who can exert more influence on both the
leftists and the rightists.  One of the reasons for this is that this middle
group attempts to work within the boundaries of the law.  Professor
Kwall persuasively argues that a middle group that is committed to
Jewish law is more inclined to see that Jewish law has never been stag-
nant and has always been subject to multiple interpretations.148  So,
too, can the middle group of users within the social-media community
work within the legal tradition of intellectual property laws to their
advantage.  For example, when the small start-up company, Bear
Blades, received a cease-and-desist letter from Bear Grylls Ventures
for using a mark the company believed was too close to its own, it
pushed back on Twitter instead of capitulating.149  Bear Blades be-
lieved that its mark was not likely to cause confusion with Bear Grylls
Ventures, the trademark of the celebrity adventurer, and rallied its
followers to share their views on the topic to prove that others
thought the same.  Bear Grylls himself subsequently agreed that Bear
Blades was not a threat, tweeting at them, “@BearBladesUK you guys
are good to go!  Apologies again.  Good luck and let us know if we
147. There are a number of scholars looking into this very issue. See THE TAKEDOWN PRO-
JECT, http://takedownproject.org/projects (last visited Feb. 11, 2015).  In particular, research led
by leading international scholar Professor Niva Elkin-Koren is mapping the tightening of this
legal regime.  For an abstract of the research, see The New Enforcement Regime: Copyright En-
forcement in Cyberspace and the Rights of the Individual, U. HAIFA, http://weblaw.haifa.ac.il/en/
research/researchcenters/techlaw/researchprojects/pages/copyrightenforcement.aspx (last visited
Feb. 11, 2015).
148. See supra Part II.B.
149. Alex Aldridge, That Awkward Moment When Your Celebrity Client Tweets His Horror at
the Copyright Infringement Letter You Sent on His Behalf, LEGAL CHEEK (Aug. 11, 2014, 11:43
AM), http://www.legalcheek.com/2014/08/that-awkward-moment-when-your-celebrity-client-
tweets-his-horror-at-the-copyright-infringement-letter-you-sent-on-his-behalf/.  This is also a
good example of “shaming” a trademark bully, which I discussed in a prior article. See generally
Grinvald, Shaming, supra note 121.
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can ever help you in your endeavours.  BG.”150  The question then
becomes how we grow this middle group and strengthen their voices?
3. Intellectual Property Law’s Explicit and Interpretative Positions
Lastly, there are parallels between the explicit and implicit prohibi-
tions within Jewish law and within intellectual property law.  The tacit
lesson from Professor Kwall’s analysis of this point, as discussed above
in Part I, is that it may be more strategic for those seeking legal
changes to work first on the interpretative positions, rather than on
the explicit ones.  In intellectual property law, one example of a paral-
lel distinction is counterfeiting as an explicit prohibition in trademark
law,151 whereas commercial parodies are more of an interpretative
prohibition.152
With respect to counterfeiting, United States federal trademark law
explicitly prohibits counterfeit products, which are unauthorized
“fakes” of original products.  Counterfeiters attempt to pass counter-
feits off as the original product, which is a severe crime, punishable by
up to ten years in prison (among other remedies available to the gov-
ernment or trademark holder pursuing a lawsuit).153  Although overt
attempts at changing the law have been few, some arguments have
been made against viewing all counterfeits as bad, based on the type
of counterfeit at issue.154  However, these attempts have not been met
with any success, at least in the United States, where international
agreements such as the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(ACTA) have been signed to expand the reach of enforcement
efforts.155
150. Aldridge, supra note 149.  Of course, not all struggles are quite as easily resolved.  I
discussed in a previous article the conflict between a small beer brewery in Vermont and a large
beverage corporation and the resulting struggle to obtain a nonjudicial settlement.  Grinvald,
Shaming, supra note 121, at 627.
151. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2012) (prohibiting the “use in commerce any reproduction, coun-
terfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use
is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive” (emphasis added)).
152. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 24:72 (4th ed. 2015) (noting that a court’s holding in a trademark case could be explained by an
implicit prohibition on commercial parody); see also Caroline Hewitt Fischer, GoldieBlox and
the Three Beastie Boys: The Emerging Trend of Fair Use Appropriation of Protected Material as a
Business Marketing Strategy, 17 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 255, 258 (2014) (noting copyright
law’s different approaches to commercial parodies).
153. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2320(a)–(b).
154. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Port, A Case Against the ACTA, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1131,
1171–81 (2012) (arguing that counterfeit luxury products have a positive effect on their
manufacturers).
155. Grinvald, Resolving the IP Disconnect, supra note 21, at 1497.  Although the United
States signed ACTA, the agreement has not become effective internationally. Id. at 1497 n.22.
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By contrast, with respect to commercial parodies, federal trademark
and copyright law do not explicitly prohibit unauthorized use of an-
other’s trademark for purposes of criticism or commentary.  Instead,
courts have held that while the First Amendment applies to protect
some forms of parody, commercial parodies can still constitute trade-
mark infringement.156  In copyright law, the reason the prohibition is
an interpretative one lies in the fair use defense, which is a statutory
four factor test.157  The first factor considers, “the purpose and charac-
ter of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or
is for nonprofit educational purposes.”158  This language indicates that
the commercial nature of the work should be taken into account, but
does not explicitly state that a commercial work can never be consid-
ered fair use.  Therefore, the courts have had to interpret this lan-
guage, and initially, in Sony v. Betamax,159 the United States Supreme
Court created a presumption in favor of infringement if the unautho-
rized use of the copyright at issue was for a commercial purpose.160
Approximately ten years later, the Supreme Court revisited this issue,
criticizing the Sixth Circuit for applying this presumption in Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music.161  Current jurisprudence remains unsettled, and
a number of courts to address the question after Campbell have held
on either side of the issue.162  This is an issue ripe for change, and
utilizing Professor Kwall’s lesson with respect to explicit versus inter-
pretative positions, this Commentary argues in greater detail that the
middle group of users needs to work on changing interpretative
prohibitions, such as commercial parodies.
IV. APPLYING THE LESSONS TO STRENGTHEN USER VOICES
Having drawn the parallels between modern intellectual property
law and The Myth of the Cultural Jew, this Part applies the three les-
sons that have been culled from her work.  As discussed, Professor
Kwall is concerned with the preservation of the Jewish tradition gen-
erally, and this Commentary’s concern is with the preservation of the
156. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 776 (8th Cir. 1994); Mu-
tual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987); Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R.H. Macy &
Co., 446 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
157. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
158. Id. § 107(1).
159. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
160. Id. at 449 (“If the Betamax were used to make copies for a commercial or profit-making
purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair.”).
161. 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994).
162. Matthew D. Bunker & Clay Calvert, The Jurisprudence of Transformation: Intellectual
Incoherence and Doctrinal Murkiness Twenty Years After Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 12
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 92, 102–06 (2014) (discussing various cases).
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sharing culture of the social-media community.  If intellectual prop-
erty holders are given free reign with their restrictive interpretations
of the law, either the middle group of users will be pushed to the left
and become scofflaws, or the sharing culture will die a death of a
thousand cuts.163  If the former occurs, intellectual property laws may
become irrelevant for large swathes of Americans, as some have ar-
gued has already occurred with respect to copyright law.164  And if the
latter occurs, something special and unique about the social-media
community will be lost.  There may be some who believe that this
Commentary exaggerates the cultural value of LOLcats,165 but laugh-
ter and creativity both have important societal benefits.166
Before providing suggestions on how to make user voices more
powerful, it is important to note that this Commentary is simply an
addition to the extremely rich commentary already present in the aca-
demic literature.167  This Commentary suggests that we need to ac-
tively build up the middle group of social-media users, based on the
cogent lessons from The Myth of the Cultural Jew.  These “middleists”
need to work within the law, as scofflaws will not be taken seriously
by intellectual property holders, the courts, or Congress.  Finally, a
strategy for the middleists to use is suggested: work first on interpreta-
tive prohibitions, such as commercial parody.
A. Creating the “Middleists”
The problem with being in the middle is that it is not as dramatic or
as cause worthy as being on the left or the right.  Being a revolution-
ary or a traditionalist contains more powerful rhetoric than simple
163. See generally TIMOTHY BROOK ET AL., DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS (2008) (exploring
the Chinese torture technique of slow slicing).  This term has grown to acquire a new definition,
one of “creeping normalcy,” as Professor Jared Diamond has described. JARED DIAMOND, COL-
LAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED 425 (2005).
164. John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 84, available at http://
www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas.html.
165. See Aaron Rutkoff, With “LOLcats” Internet Fad, Anyone Can Get In on the Joke, WALL
ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB118798557326508182 (last updated Aug. 25, 2007, 11:59
PM).
166. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the
Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1950 (2006).
167. Unfortunately there is not enough space for any type of literature review, but for addi-
tional reading on the topic and suggestions on strengthening user voices, please see generally the
sources listed in supra note 135, as well as the following resources: JASON MAZZONE,
COPYFRAUD AND OTHER ABUSES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2011); Niva Elkin-Koren,
Tailoring Copyright to Social Production, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 309 (2011); Gerhardt,
supra note 11; Ramsey, supra note 100; Peter K. Yu, Can the Canadian UGC Exception Be
Transplanted Abroad? 26 OSGOODE HALL INTELL. PROP. J. 175 (2014).
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moderation.168  A similar lack of sexiness can potentially impede the
creation of a middle group within the social-media community.  This
Commentary is not advocating for a revolution, rather it is urging in-
cremental changes and a preservation of a culture that has grown or-
ganically with the support of the entire community (leftists, middleists,
and rightists alike).
This Commentary’s proposal for how to create the “middleists” is
not earth-shattering, but it is not discussed often enough: more educa-
tion of social-media users about intellectual property laws from objec-
tive sources, similar to Professor Kwall’s call for more Jewish
education.169  Intermediaries may have a role here to play—namely
the social-media sites themselves.170  For example, Twitter is some-
what helpful by delineating what is and what is not acceptable through
its policies.171  Improvements to the rules could include additional
guidelines of what is meant to “mislead” or “confuse” others as to a
brand or business affiliation, possibly through examples of those ac-
counts Twitter closed due to a violation of these policies.172  Addition-
ally, other social-media intermediaries such as Facebook and
LinkedIn, which do not have similar policies, should step in.  Further,
nonprofit organizations, such as ChillingEffects.org and The Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation, provide valuable educational services to
the public about copyright-related issues (and at times, trademark is-
sues as well).173  More services need to be available to the public, as
168. See Francis Fukuyama, The Middle-Class Revolution, WALL ST. J. (June 28, 2013, 7:51
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323873904578571472700348086 (discussing
the problems facing middle-class revolutionaries).
169. “Objective” refers to sources that are not necessarily connected to intellectual property
holders, such as industry groups or the federal government.  For Professor Kwall’s call for addi-
tional education in the Jewish context, including the use of narrative in such education, see
KWALL, supra note 24, at 291–94 and the discussion in Part II.B.
170. Of course, Section 512 of the Copyright Act does require intermediaries to respond to
intellectual property holders (I thank Scott Boone for raising this issue) in order to escape liabil-
ity for copyright infringement by their users.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012).  However, not all allega-
tions of copyright infringement are accurate.  In fact, the Twitter rules specifically state that “not
all unauthorized uses of copyrighted materials are infringements.” Copyright and DMCA Pol-
icy, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/groups/56-policies-violations/topics/236-twitter-rules-
policies/articles/15795-copyright-and-dmca-policy# (last visited Feb. 11, 2015).  Further, Section
512 does not preclude intermediaries from attempting to change the norms of online behavior.
171. The Twitter Rules, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311-the-twitter-rules#
(last visited Feb. 11, 2015); Parody, Commentary, and Fan Account Policy, TWITTER, https://sup
port.twitter.com/groups/56-policies-violations/topics/236-twitter-rules-policies/articles/106373-
parody-commentary-and-fan-account-policy# (last visited Feb. 11, 2015); Trademark Policy,
TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/groups/56-policies-violations/topics/236-twitter-rules-poli-
cies/articles/18367-trademark-policy# (last visited Feb. 11, 2015).
172. Trademark Policy, supra note 171.
173. See generally CHILLINGEFFECTS, www.chillingeffects.org (last visited Feb. 11, 2015),
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., www.eff.org (last visited Feb. 11, 2015).
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well as additional attention highlighting the existence of these ser-
vices.  For example, having a free hotline that allows users to call with
specific questions about their uses, or additional law school clinics that
provide free or low-cost legal services to those middleists who run
afoul of an intellectual property bully, would benefit users.174
B. Working Within the Legal Tradition
This education and low-cost or free legal help is crucial because it
will provide the tools that these middleists need to work within intel-
lectual property laws to create incremental change.  The next Part will
address the strategy of how to accomplish change.  But it is important
to note that the middleists need to work within the legal tradition—
not without.  The reason for this is the interdependence of the entire
social-media community, as discussed above, which is similar to the
Jewish community.  Intellectual property holders create the intellec-
tual property shared by users, but it is the users who, through their
sharing, validate and give value to the intellectual property.175  In ad-
dition, even the top-down members of the community—the judges,
Congress, and intellectual property holders—are also part of the com-
munity.  While challenges to laws that we believe are unconstitutional
or illegal have their place in our society,176 due to the interdependent
nature of this community, changes to intellectual property laws need
buy in from intellectual property holders, judges, and Congress.
Many intellectual property holders are fiercely protective of what
they see as traditional exclusivity in their intellectual property.  Being
on the right end of the spectrum, these intellectual property holders
will likely seek to maintain this exclusivity, or even push for more ex-
clusiveness.  Due to this, those who work outside of the legal tradition
can have a negative impact on legal change.  As in the Jewish commu-
nity, where the Reform approach to the question of “who is a Jew”
polarizes the approaches on the right, so, too if the middleists attempt
to change intellectual property laws by completely flouting them, this
may polarize intellectual property holders’ positions.  It is important
to remember that the legal tradition gives a common language to the
community.177  If the middleists do not work within the law, then they
lose common ground with the intellectual property holders, and their
efforts will be seen as simply flouting legal tradition.
174. I defined “trademark bully” in a previous work.  Grinvald, Shaming, supra note 121, at
642.
175. Gerhardt, supra note 11, at 1497.
176. See generally PEN˜ALVER & KATYAL, supra note 134.
177. See KWALL, supra note 24, at 162.
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C. Strategizing: Changing Intellectual Property Law’s
Interpretative Positions
With this law-abiding middleist group established, a good strategy
to approaching legal change is useful.  Here, the final lesson from The
Myth of the Cultural Jew, is quite apt.  Change is more easily made to
interpretative prohibitions than explicit ones.  Similar to the prohibi-
tion against counterfeiting trademarked products, within social media,
counterfeiting a brand or a person is also a fairly explicit prohibi-
tion.178  While there are those who impersonate others on social me-
dia for social commentary or parody,179 this type of use is intended to
mislead, confuse, or even prey on those who seek out the real brand
or person.  Take, for example, the fake “Nine West Auditions” page
that was established on Facebook, which claimed it was holding audi-
tions for new Nine West foot models.180  It asked potential models to
send in pictures and other information.  It was then exposed as a
fraudulent page, but not before over 400 women sent in pictures and
personal information.181  This type of confusion produces real harm,
not just to brands (here, Nine West), but also to users.  The societal
need to prevent this type of harm means that this explicit prohibition
will be a pretty tough nut to crack.182
On the other hand, there are those who utilize intellectual property
not for impersonation, but rather to create humorous social commen-
tary, such as satire or parody.183  As discussed in Part II.C., an inter-
178. This assumes that the counterfeiter was using a brand name to sell a product. See Ram-
sey, supra note 100, at 872 (noting that trademark infringement becomes questionable when an
impersonator is not using the brand name for commercial purposes).
179. Kim Severson, Fight Escalates over Twitter Parody of N.Y. Food Critic, INT’L HERALD
TRIB., Apr. 24, 2009, at 18.
180. Complaint at 7–9, Nine W. Dev. Corp. v. Does 1–10, No. 07-cv-7533 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug.
24, 2007), available at http://www.counterfeitchic.com/Cases/cic/3/ninewest.pdf.
181. Rebecca Tushnet, Facebook Fraud, REBECCA TUSHNET’S 43(B)LOG (Dec. 20, 2007),
http://tushnet.blogspot.com/search?q=facebook+fraud.
182. There are those who impersonate a brand or person for social-commentary purposes,
such as Greenpeace’s Let’s Go! Shell in the Arctic, ARTICREADY.COM, http://arcticready.com (last
visited Apr. 20, 2015), and they may want to have intellectual property laws loosened for these
purposes.  In addition, there are now a variety of criminal laws that criminalize certain types of
online impersonation. See Victor Luckerson, Can You Go to Jail for Impersonating Someone
Online?, TIME (Jan. 22, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/01/22/can-you-go-to-jail-for-imper-
sonating-someone-online/.  As noted above, Professor Lisa Ramsey has proposed an “imperson-
ation” theory of trademark law which, if adopted by courts, would balance free speech interests
with the intellectual property rights of the brand or person impersonated. See generally Ramsey,
supra note 100.
183. Satire is defined as “a literary work holding up human vices and follies to ridicule or
scorn.” Satire, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dic-
tionary/satire (last visited Feb. 11, 2015).  Parody is defined as “a literary or musical work in
which the style of an author or work is closely imitated for comic effect or in ridicule.” Parody,
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pretative prohibition exists in both copyright and trademark laws,
stating that if the unauthorized parody is for commercial purposes,
then the use of the intellectual property is more likely considered an
infringement.184  The struggle over how to construe commercial paro-
dies reveals the implicit nature of this prohibition, similar to the strug-
gle over allowing more women to participate in synagogue ritual.185
With current jurisprudence remaining unsettled, this is an issue ripe
for the changing, and the recent case of Goldieblox is a good example
of how the strategy of changing interpretative prohibitions may work.
Goldieblox is a small business that makes engineering toys geared
towards young girls.186  Its mission is to encourage more young girls to
enter into the “STEM” (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math-
ematics) fields through playing with these types of toys early on in
childhood.187  To promote one of its products, Goldieblox created and
released a YouTube video using the Beastie Boys’ song “Girls.”188
“Girls” is a song infamous for its sexist and crude lyrics.189  In the
video, three young girls construct a toy while singing to the tune of
“Girls,” but with completely different lyrics.190  For example, instead
of “Girls to do the dishes,” they sang, “Girls to build a spaceship.”191
The video immediately went viral, amassing 8 million views in a very
short time frame.192  The toy became a top seller on Amazon.com, and
MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/parody
(last visited Feb. 11, 2015).
184. For a discussion of copyright law and the tendency to limit commercial parodies, see
Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV.
989, 1024–30 (1997).  For a discussion of trademark law and commercial parodies, see 4 LOUIS
ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMAN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOP-
OLIES § 22:61 (4th ed. 2014) (discussing various cases of trademark law and parodies in general,
including commercial parodies).
185. See supra Part II.C.
186. See About, GOLDIEBLOX, http://www.goldieblox.com/pages/about (last visited Feb. 11,
2015).
187. Id. (“We aim to disrupt the pink aisle and inspire the future generation of female
engineers.”).
188. Aaron Taube, A Small Girls’ Toy Company Claims the Beastie Boys Want To Ban This
Video, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 25, 2013, 11:12 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/goldieblox-is-
suing-the-beastie-boys-2013-11.
189. Jena McGregor, The Brains Behind the Viral GoldieBlox Video, WASH. POST (Nov. 21,
2013, 2:05 PM), http:// www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/on-leadership/wp/2013/11/21/the-brains-
behind-the-viral-goldieblox-video/; see also Alyson Shontell, A Stanford Engineer Figured Out a
Real Reason Fewer Women Code, and a Video She Created About It Has Gone Viral, BUS. IN-
SIDER (Nov. 20, 2013, 8:15 AM), http:// www.businessinsider.com/goldieblox-girls-video-2013-11.
190. Dave Itzkoff, Beastie Boys Fight Online Video Parody of “Girls,” N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25,
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video-parody-of-girls/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
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Goldieblox ultimately won a competition that gave it a thirty-second
commercial spot during the January 2014 Super Bowl game.193
Although it is unclear how members of the Beastie Boys voiced
their opposition to the use of their song in this commercial parody,
Goldieblox took their opposition as a direct threat and filed a lawsuit
for declaratory judgment.194  In its complaint, Goldieblox argued that
it was simply making fair use of “Girls,” having created a parody that
makes fun of the song and criticizes the message that the original song
sends.195  The Beastie Boys filed a counterclaim and answer, alleging
every form of copyright and trademark infringement possible.196  The
group later released an open letter to Goldieblox stating that its pri-
mary reason for objecting to the use of its song in Goldieblox’s com-
mercial was that the group had long ago decided to never allow its
songs to be used in commercials.197  For this reason, Goldieblox
agreed to settle with the group and to dismiss its lawsuit.198
193. Holy Axles, We Won!, GOLDIEBLOX (Jan. 31, 2014), http:// blog.goldieblox.com/2014/01/
holy-axles-we-won/; see also Paul Farhi, The Rules of the Super Bowl Advertising Game, WASH.
POST (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/the-rules-of-the-super-bowl-
ad-game/2014/01/31/6333b7fe-89f3-11e3-a5bd-844629433ba3_story.html (discussing the impor-
tance of Super Bowl advertising).
194. It is hard to determine whether the Beastie Boys sent an actual cease-and-desist letter
because the group claimed that its letter was simply an inquiry into how and why Goldieblox
used the song “Girls.”  Itzkoff, supra note 190.  This likely set up an argument that there would
be no justiciable claim to sustain a declaratory judgment action see Grinvald, Policing, supra
note 15, manuscript at 31 and muddied the waters by trying to figure out whether the Beastie
Boys’ would have attempted to block the video or would have come to some settlement with
Goldieblox allowing it to continue the use of the song for noncommercial purposes.  Itzkoff,
supra note 190 (quoting the open letter sent from the Beastie Boys to Goldieblox: “Like many of
the millions of people who have seen your toy commercial ‘GoldieBlox, Rube Goldberg & the
Beastie Boys, we were very impressed by the creativity and the message behind your ad. . . . As
creative as it is, make no mistake, your video is an advertisement that is designed to sell a prod-
uct, and long ago, we made a conscious decision not to permit our music and/or name to be used
in product ads.  When we tried to simply ask how and why our song ‘Girls’ had been used in your
ad without our permission, YOU sued US”).
195. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 2, GoldieBlox, Inc. v.
Island Def Jam Music Grp., No. 13-cv-05428 (N.D. Cal. filed Nov. 21, 2013) (stating that the
video was created “to comment on the Beastie Boys song, and to further the company’s goal to
break down gender stereotypes and to encourage young girls to engage in activities that chal-
lenge their intellect, particularly in the fields of science, technology, engineering and math”).
196. Answer, First Amended Counterclaims, and Demand for Jury Trial, GoldieBlox, Inc. v.
Island Def Jam Music Grp., No. 13-cv-05428 (N.D. Cal. dated Feb. 24, 2014) (claiming copyright
and trademark infringement, false advertising, unfair competition, and misappropriation of the
right of publicity).
197. Itzkoff, supra note 190 (quoting the letter).
198. Our Letter to the Beastie Boys, GOLDIEBLOX, (Nov. 27, 2013), http://blog.goldieblox.com/
2013/11/our-letter-to-the-beastie-boys/.  However, it is unclear whether the parties have actually
settled.
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Goldieblox is a great example on multiple levels.  First, it highlights
the type of social-media “middleist” group that this Commentary is
attempting to create:  those individuals and entities that know the law
and can use it to their benefit.199  Second, it illustrates the type of use
that could be used to overturn the interpretative prohibition on com-
mercial parodies.  With all the other factors of fair use in Goldieblox’s
favor,200 the only factor that was not directly in its favor was the com-
mercial aspect of the parody.  The reason for this was simply judicial
interpretation, which is easier to overturn than explicit statutory lan-
guage.  If enough entities and individuals to fight back against these
types of infringement claims, enough cases would be amassed to over-
turn the interpretative prohibition on commercial parodies.201  And,
then, perhaps, users’ voices would be stronger and louder.
V. CONCLUSION
Social media continues to thrive.  It seems like every day a new ser-
vice or application aimed at allowing you to share more and more is
unvailed.202  Although this Commentary focuses on the United States,
social media is a worldwide phenomenon that continues its exponen-
tial growth.203  This Commentary suggests that social media’s sharing
199. However, Goldieblox has declared that it will not be a middleist anymore, as it stated in
its apology letter to the Beastie Boys that it will obtain appropriate licenses before it creates
future videos.  The letter also encourages other small companies to do the same.  GoldieBlox’s
apology was posted on its homepage, but has since been taken down.  Simon Dumenco, Here’s
the Apology Letter to the Beastie Boys That GoldieBlox Buried, AD AGE (Mar. 19, 2014), http://
adage.com/article/the-media-guy/read-apology-beastie-boys-goldieblox-buried/292223/ (“We sin-
cerely apologize for any negative impact our actions may have had on the Beastie Boys. . . .
From now on, we will secure the proper rights and permissions in advance of any promotions,
and we advise any other young company to do the same.”).  This is exactly the type of behavior
that this Commentary is concerned with, as it is unlikely that GoldieBlox could have made its
video and created such a sensation through obtaining a license.
200. See Fischer, supra note 152, at 270–72 (discussing the four-factor analysis of fair use).
201. There are a few of these cases already, but not enough to make a dent in the jurispru-
dence, as the implicit prohibition still stands. See Gwynne Watkins, Ask a Lawyer: Who Has the
Better Case, the Beastie Boys or GoldieBlox?, VULTURE (Dec. 14, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://www
.vulture.com/2013/12/beastie-boys-goldieblox-lawsuit-who-will-win.html (interviewing an attor-
ney about the Goldieblox case who stated, “[I]t can be commercial and still be fair use, and it’s
usually going to help if it’s non-commercial, but just because it’s not commercial or just because
it’s a parody doesn’t mean that it’s necessarily fair use”).
202. Kyli Singh, 10 Rising Social Networks You Should Explore, MASHABLE (July 28, 2014),
http://mashable.com/2014/07/28/social-networks-on-the-rise/ (listing ten new social-media appli-
cations and Web sites made available in 2014).
203. For example, in 2012, China’s social media sites such as QQ, Qzone, and Sina Weibo had
approximately the same number of users as Facebook had worldwide in 2014. Compare Henry
Fong, 5 Things You Need To Know About Chinese Social Media, FORBES (Oct. 25, 2012, 2:02
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2012/10/25/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-chi-
nese-social-media/ (listing the various sites with monthly user statistics), with Press Release,
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culture is a societal benefit that is under attack.  Some intellectual
property holders want to maintain exclusive control over their intel-
lectual property, but only when they disapprove of unauthorized uses.
When they approve of such uses, intellectual property holders are
quite happy to be part of the sharing community, and in fact, benefit
economically from doing so.204  Unfortunately for the sharing commu-
nity, the voices of objecting intellectual property holders are heard
more loudly than the voices of the users.  This Commentary looks to
Professor Roberta Rosenthal Kwall’s timely new work, The Myth of
the Cultural Jew, for answers to the question of how to strengthen
social-media users’ voices.  There are multiple parallels between the
struggles within the social-media community and the Jewish commu-
nity, and Professor Kwall’s use of cultural analysis to find answers is
extremely relevant.  All members of the social-media community,
from leftists to intellectual property holders, benefit from sharing.
And to share in Professor Kwall’s conclusion to her book, “In the end,
[we] are all part of the same family.”205
Facebook, Facebook Reports Third Quarter 2014 Results (Oct. 28, 2014) http://investor.fb.com/
releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=878726 (reporting that as of September 30, 2014, Facebook had
1.35 billion monthly active users).
204. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
205. KWALL, supra note 24, at 297.
